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INDONESIA 
Damien Kingsbury 
On October 12, 2002, two bombs exploded in Bali's tourist center of Kuta, killing 202 
people. It was the world's introduction to Indonesia's Islamist-inspired terrorism. Nine 
months later, in May 2003, Indonesian soldiers parachuted into Banda Aceh airport as 
a show of "shock and awe" for journalists who were to become "embedded" with military 
forces in their renewed assault on the separatist Free Aceh Movement. These two 
events were disconnected in almost every sense, yet both were claimed as manifesta-' 
tions of the global post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) security environment. Islamist ter-
rorists from the Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI, or Islamic Community) network who had links 
back to al Qaeda and the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan saw their attack in Bali as 
part of a wider jihad (holy struggle), but drew on a domestic history of Islamic rebellion.l 
In Aceh, the renewal of operations against the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, GAM) more reflected a reassertion of military authority in a state in transi-
tion from authoritarian government, but with some of the superficial appearance of 
the U.s.-led "war on terror." This chapter considers Indonesia's successive responses 
to and relationship with Islamist terrorism, its shifting security relationship with the 
United States, and changes in its intelligence and military structure within the con-
text of a transition from an authoritarian political system in the period after 9/11. 
Between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia has long been of strategiq 
importance, and continues to be so. It is the world's fourth most populous country, 
with some 230 million people, around 90 percent of whom are Muslim, making it the 
world's biggest Islamic state. More fundamentalist versions of Islam account for per-
haps 4 or 5 percent of the population, and the non-Islamic community is made up of 
Protestant and Catholic Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus.2 Based on a colonial em-
pire across some 350 linguistic groups over 18,000 islands, Indonesia has long been a 
state ill fitted to its multiethnic population. Its natural tendency toward fragmenta-
tion was addressed by the imposition of a unitary structure, although this exacerbated 
rather than resolved many regional tensions. This was exacerbated by a divided and 
often corrupt elite and, in response to perceived political failure, the rise of the Indo-
nesian Communist Party and its destruction by the army and militant Muslims in 
1965-1966. This event led to the ushering in of military-patrimonial rule under Gen-
eral (later President) Suharto. 
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POLITICAL TRANSITION 
On May 18, 1998, President Suharto resigned from office, ending thirty-one years of 
personalized rule in which the Indonesian state was characterized by moderate but 
poorly distributed economic development combined with a security response to politi-
cal issues, widespread repression and the abrogation of civil and political rights, mas-
sive corruption, and a military and security apparatus that functioned, with varying 
degrees of engagement, as a branch of the government and as a largely autonomous 
power in its own right. As with many political transitions from authoritarian rule,3 
Indonesia's transition has not been linear nor at the time of writing could it be said to 
be complete. 
Indonesia's military-Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) , later 
Tentara N asional Indonesia (TNI)-has not only rationalized its political role in In-
donesia through what was called its dwijungsi (dual function) of civil and military 
duty,4 but employs an organizational "territorial" structure that allocates it through-
out the country more or less parallel to the provinces and their political substruc-
tures. Beyond this, the TNI has historically been largely financially independent of the 
government, receiving around two-thirds to three-quarters of its total income from 
nongovernment sources, including charitable foundations (yayasan) that are effec-
tively holding companies for legal businesses including transport, construction, and 
service industries; quasi-legal activities including Ilprotection" services and resource 
extraction; and a range of illegal activities including smuggling (oil products, automo-
biles), drug and gun running, extortion, prostitution, and gambling. This financial 
independence ha_s meant that the TNI is also largely politically independent of the 
government and its preferences and sometimes of its directives. 
Closely linked to and often overlapping with the TNI are Indonesia's intelligence 
services, notably the coordinating State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen N egara, 
BIN), which was expanded and upgraded following the events of 9/11. BIN is primar-
ily staffed and usually headed by military officers who have ex-officio ministerial sta-
tus, although it also employs a number of civilians. BIN has extensive powers in rela-
tion to any broadly defined Ithreat to the nation," including employing police and other 
government and intelligence resources for investigations, powers of arrest for up to 
seven days and detention for thirty days, and arbitrary summons and search powers. 
BIN has no formal oversight mechanism. (As of 2007 the draft of an intelligence law 
has been published by the government containing provision for a very limited form of 
oversight.) A government-sponsored review identified BIN as being implicated in the 
murder of prominent human rights activist Munir Said Thalib in September 2004. In 
September 2006, BIN was identified as from May 2005 using a presidential charitable 
trust to lobby the U.S. government to remove barriers to "security cooperation" with 
Indonesia, including military links to the TNJ.5 
While the military was closely aligned with President Suharto, from the late 
1980s in particular there were tensions between significant proportions of the Indone-
sian military and the president, notably around issues of presidential corruption and 
access to resources. This led to a more or less open split in the military by the early 
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1990s between officers loyal to the president and who were often characterized as 
overtly Islamic (or "green") and officers who styled themselves as "professional" or 
"secular-nationalist" (red and white). The red and white faction ascended in the wake 
of Suharto's political demise, but thereafter divided between officers in favor of military 
and political reform and those who wished to reestablish the military's independence 
from direct presidential control and thus reassert the military's political autonomy.s 
Coming to political power on the back of the anti-communist purge in the mid-
1960s, the Indonesian military was strongly favored by various U.S. administrations as 
a strategically important Cold War bulwark in Southeast Asia. At this time, the United 
States was much less concerned with the political niceties of democracy and human 
rights than it was with shoring up reliable alliances in strategically important areas, 
not least of which was the main conduit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (and 
the Middle East and Japan and the U.s. West Coast). As a result, many Indonesian 
officers trained in the United States and Indonesia received equipment and supplies 
from the U.S. government. FollOwing approval from the United States,? Indonesia in-
vaded East Timor in 1975, and in its consequent occupation until 1999 up to 180,000 
people were killed or died as a direct result, while the use of murder, rape, and torture 
became routine.s Following the 1991 massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the 
U.S. Congress placed a ban on military support for or engagement with ABRIITNI. 
Despite efforts by later administrations to have this ban lifted, the TNI supported 
rampage in East Timor following the independence ballot of 1999 further cemented 
this ban. 
Between an inability to adequately fund the TNI and its historically powerful 
political role, respective governments have had little incentive or capacity for military 
control. As president, Abdurrahman Wahid did make attempts in this direction, but 
was undermined by the TNI and other opposition groups and pushed from office in a 
constitutional coup in 2001. His successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, was aligned with 
the dominant group within the TNI and supported the reassertion of military author-
ity, especially in relation to claims to separatism in Aceh and Papua. Along with J a-
karta's military-backed centralized control came a high level of corruption and little 
legal redress. Political opposition was subject to intelligence scrutiny and interfer- .~ 
ence, while public protests or regional opposition consistently met with military vio-
lence. Between 16,000 and 26,000 people were killed in Aceh between 1976 and 2005,9 
there are claims that more than 100,000 have been killed in Papua since 1963.10 
Despite a freeze on military to military links, the election of George W. Bush as 
U.S. president in 2000 and a return to an overtly interventionist approach to interna-
tional relations led his administration to attempt to move more closely to the TNI. A 
number of efforts in this direction were rebuffed by a still suspicious Congress ,11 not 
least after the TNI was implicated in the murder of two U.s. schoolteachers in Papua 
in 2002.12 But following the U.S.-led war on terror (and the TNI's rhetorical enthusi-
asm for it), Indonesia's status as the world's largest Muslim state and evidence of 
links between Indonesian Islamist terrorists and al Qaeda eventually prized apart 
congressional reluctance, first with support for police and anti-terrorism training and 
then, in 2006, with a full resumption of military to military links. These were initially 
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through the supply of nonlethal equipment, then direct military training, and finally 
the resumption of arms sales. Indonesia having turned toward other arms suppliers, 
including Russia, concerned U.S. strategists, and the ascension to the presidency by 
SusHo Bambang Yudhoyono in October 2004 and his pro-Western, reform-oriented 
policies clinched the return to full military cooperation. As a U.S.-educated armyof-
ficer, Yudhoyono had been the TNI's leading reformer, having been primarily respon-
sible for drafting its "new paradigm" program of reform. I3 That the reform group within 
the red and white faction was by 2002 pushed from power had little direct impact on 
Yudhoyono, who by this time had transferred to the political arena as Indonesia's most 
senior minister under both Wahid and Sukarnoputri. His cautious if consistent reform 
program, including gradually bringing the TNI under civilian authority, resumed after 
he assumed the presidency, and U.S. support for the TNI was largely predicated on 
Yudhoyono's reformist credentials. 
POST-gill RESPONSES 
Within a few days of the attack on the World Trade Center in New York, then Indone-
sian President Megawati Sukarnoputri traveled to Washington to meet with President 
Bush. The visit had been previously planned so that Megawati and President Bush 
could renew the Bilateral Defense Dialogue (BDD), not held since 1997 that was in-
tended to renew military links (International Military Education and Training funds, 
IMET) between the United States and Indonesia. Military links had initially been cut 
off in 1991, and restored in 1993 under the Joint Combined Exchange and Training 
program (JeET), but the sale of light weapons was stopped in 1994 and this limitation 
was expanded in 1995 and 1996 to include heavy weapons and equipment. IMET was 
restored in 1996 and 1997, but cancelled in mid-1997 by President Suharto following 
U.S. criticism of Indonesia's human rights record. 14 In 1999 military training and equip-
ment transfers were again banned, with the exception of very limited training in com-
bined exercises, and later the sale of some spare parts for military transport aircraft 
(C-130 and CN-235) .15 The BDD followed earlier efforts by the U.S. administration to 
renew military links as part of its bid to build a coalition to contain the rise of China. IS 
As the world's largest predominantly Muslim state, in the post-9/ll environment, the 
U.s. administration was also keen to again have Indonesia on its side, and as its head 
and with her close relations with the TNI, Megawati was welcomed in Washington. It 
was the first ever visit to Washington by the leader of a major Muslim state. 
Megawati's overt enthusiasm for U.S military support and, as a diplomatic pre-
requisite, the U.S.-led war on terror, initially prompted a negative reaction among 
many Muslims in Indonesia, including her vice president, Hamza Has, who said that 
the 9/11 attacks "could cleanse the sins of the US"I7 and later called on the United 
States to stop its attacks in Afghanistan. IS In response, Megawati cooled her enthusi-
asm for the war on terror, but she retained enthusiasm for renewed military links. The 
question was how could the war on terror be manipulated to suit Indonesia's interests 
without alienating its Muslim majority? A focus on terrorism was now "politically 
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correct,"19 but this could not be seen, in Indonesia, to equate to an attack on Muslims 
and hence an attack on Islam. 
The answer to this question was that GAM was labeled by Indonesia as a "terror-
ist" organization. After the loss of East Timor in 1999, increasing demands for inde-
pendence in Aceh, and the stepping up of Acehnese separatist guerilla activity, the 
TNI was keen to reassert its central role in state cohesion. The government of Indo-
nesia and the GAM had signed a ceasefire agreement in December 2002, but by May 
2003 the agreement had been wrecked on the ground and talks intended to rescue the 
ceasefire were engineered into a call for GAM's surrender. GAM refused and the TNI 
launched its largest military operation since the 1975 invasion of East Timor. 
In launching this renewed military campaign in Aceh, the TNI was quick to adopt 
much of the rhetoric and some of the practice of the U.S. military in its war on terror. 
This was most notable in the embedding of journalists in military units, though few 
journalists were allowed in to Aceh, access was otherwise difficult, and each journal-
ist to be embedded had to undergo special "training" (indoctrination). Much more 
than the United States, however, the TNI pressured questioning media organizations 
into adopting an editorial position supportive of the confiict.20 There were also a num-
ber of staged media events, such as the pointless parachuting of troops in to Banda 
Aceh's airport, and the use of U.S.-derived language such as "shock and awe."21 Al-
though Indonesia was deeply reluctant to actually be drawn into the U.S. war on ter-
ror due to Islamic sympathies, it did employ what President Megawati's adviser Rizal 
Mallarangeng called "the blessing of September 11 "22 to reassert its OW:M domestic 
military agenda. The appeal to the United States was for support in what Indonesia 
claimed was its own fight against domestic terrorists (even though GAM has never 
been noted as a terrorist organization by any other government or organization). It 
also helped Indonesia try to relegitimize its profoundly tarnished special forces, Ko-
passus in particular, through its counterterrorist (CT) function (e.g., by securing a CT 
link between Kopassus and the Australian Defence Force). Kopassus had been deeply 
implicated in the carnage in East Timor in 1999 and had been involved in a range of 
other activities, including murder, kidnapping, and torture of prodemocracy activists. 
Yet as the "pointy end" of the TNI, it was Kopassus that needed to be "rehabilitated" 
first. 
The U.S.-led war on terrorism thus provided a rationalization for both a greater 
assertiveness by the TNI in relation to domestic policy and an opportunity to claim 
support from the United States and Australia,23 in particular with the CT group within 
Kopassus, Detasemen 81 (Detachment 81). While the CT section of Kopassus was 
supposed to have some separate identity from the rest of the organization, this was 
disingenuous, as all members of Detasmen 81 have always been drawn from Kopas-
sus's "dirty tricks" detachment, Detasemen Sandhi Yudha (Den Sandha, Covert War-
fare Detachment).24 Den Sandha engaged in such activities as agitation, sabotage, 
kidnapping, "terror," and so on,25 and has been implicated in or convicted of a number 
of murders. Beyond Detasemen 81 members being drawn from Den Sandha, there is 
also a rotation of staff between groups, especially from other elements of Grup III, 
Den Sandha, and Detasemen 81, and a high level of overlap of functions in the field, 
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despite the formal separation of tasks between the groups. Grup III and Den Sandha 
members were in turn drawn from other Kopassus units, and there was a high degree 
of interchange between the functions of the groups. 
ISLAM 1ST TERRORISM 
Apart from demonizing domestic separatists as "terrorists," the other key and more 
authentic element of Indonesia's post-9/11 global environment was in relation to do-
mestic Islamist terrorism. Indonesia had a number of militant Islamist organizations 
that either conducted terrorist activity or were linked to terrorist organizations, other 
via an umbrella body and in a number of cases to al Qaeda. The umbrella organization 
was t,he Indonesia Mujahidin Council (MMI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), headed by 
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who was also widely cited as head of the terrorist Islamist organi-
zation JI, which was, in turn, held responsible for several bomb attacks, most notable 
of which in October 2002 in Bali killed 202 people. The militant Islamist organizations 
grouped under the MMI included JI, Laskar Mujahidin, Laskar Jundullah, and the 
Islamic Defenders Front. Other groups, such as Laskar Jihad and Laskar Tabligh, 
were similarly Islamist although differently founded organizations. 
Indonesia has been home to Islamist extremism since 1945-1949, when Islamic 
guerrillas formed as irregular forces to fight the colonial Dutch in the war of indepen-
dence. After Indonesia gained independence in 1949, these guerrillas, formally known 
as Tentara Islam Indonesia (TIl, Indonesian Islamic Army), better known as Darul 
Islam, rebelled against the central government, extending their influence from West 
Java. The Darul Islam rebellion was joined by Islamic rebels in South and Central 
Sulawesi 1952 and 1958, respectively, and in Aceh in 1953 (although largely in rela-
tion to reasserting Aceh's historic claim to independence or a high degree of autonomy 
within a federated republic). The Darul Islam rebellion collapsed between 1961 and 
1963, but its legacy continued. 
The Islamist sensibility that fed the Darul Islam movement remained alive, espe-
cially in West Java, leading to its revival in the 1970s. This revival was complicated by 
a government Special Operations (Operasi Khussus, Opsus) «sting" in the 1970s,26 
intended to discredit radical Islam in the authoritarian New Order state. In this op-
eration, Darul Islam activists were set up as Komando Jihad in 1976-1977 and engaged 
in a number of attacks against churches and others sites, in 1981 hijacked a Garuda 
aircraft to Bangkok, and in 1985 bombed the Borobudur Buddhist temple in Central 
Java. Darul Islam members were subsequently killed, jailed, disappeared, or fled into 
exile. It was from this group that the core of new groups, including JI, were drawn.27 
As with al Qaeda, Indonesia's Islamist terrorist groups are closely associated with 
the Wahhabiyah purist or "reform" movement founded in the mid-eighteenth century 
and that prevails in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabist Islam gained influence in Indonesia dur-
ing the 1970s,28 and this influence is reflected in the MMI. The other consistent theme 
among Islamist terrorists in Indonesia and elsewhere is their association with Salafi 
puritanism (from as-salaf, "pious ancestors"). The common source of inspiration for 
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these organizations, and others elsewhere, is the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Broth-
erhood), founded in Egypt in 1928. Most movements committed to an Islamist 
agenda have three consistent themes: the desire for a single international commu-
nity undivided by ethnic or linguistic factors; the reassertion of past traditions; and 
the imposition of syariah (Islamic law) in which "nothing is superfluous and nothing 
is wanting."29 
Under Indonesia's New Order, in the early 1970s all Islamic parties were com-
bined into the United Development Party (PPP) and effectively emasculated while 
Islamic discourse was delegitimized and Islamism was construed as a threat to the 
developing secular state. Islam received a new lease of official life in the early 1990s 
when President Suharto began to cultivate Islam to balance the growing disaffection 
of most of the military. However, many Indonesians, especially the young, had already 
begun to turn to Islam as a way of steering away from the excesses of the New Order. 
The corrupt repression of the New Order, the passion of youth, and the appeal of a 
zealous, proselytizing Islamism contributed another stream of recruits to a radical 
Islamic agenda. 
By the early 1990s, President Suharto had begun to court Islam as a counter-
balance to the growing alienation of nationalist-secular sections of the military. Few 
Indonesian Muslims accepted Suharto's late embrace of Islam at face value, but 
some, including Muslim and pro-Suharto army officers, took advantage of the shift to 
strengthen their own position. As Suharto began to fall from power, Indonesia's politi-
cal tensions rose to the surface. It was in this climate of releasing repressed anger and 
frustration that more radical groups within political Islam found the opportunity to 
assert their views. These were manifested in a series of new groups, all of which had 
ideological links, degrees of organizational association, and a close and sometimes 
common history. Some of their members, such as Fauzi Hasbi, who was linked with 
JI from the 1970s until being killed in Ambon on February 21, 2003, also retained 
ties to military intelligence, in particular Major General Syafrie Sjamsuddin,30 as 
well as with Kopassus officers.3l According to one informant, a former jailed member 
of Komandio Jihad, Umar Abduh, "there is not a single Islamic group, either in the 
movement or the political groups, that is not controlledoy Intel. Everyone does what 
they say."32 
Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) 
JI is the most widely known of Indonesia's militant Islamist groups, the senior mem-
bers of which trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The group is 
said to be held together by ideology, training and "an intricate network of marriages 
that at times makes it seem like a giant extended family."34 JI had a formal chain of 
command until the arrests of numerous members following the 2002 Bali bombing. 
However, its structure was always that which could operate as independent cells 
should the chain of command be broken. While JI is primarily located in Indonesia, its 
members have also been identified as being involved in attacks in the Philippines, 
attempted attacks in Singapore, and most recently in southern Thailand. 
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JI's head was Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who in 1971 along with former Indonesian Mus-
lim Youth Movement (GPII, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) leader, Abdullah 
Sungkar, established an Islamic school near the central Javanese town of Solo, Pe-
santren al-Mu'min (Pondok Ngruki). In 1978 both Sungkar and Ba'asyirwere arrested, 
accused of being involved with Dar'ul Islam and JI. Sungkar admitted that he had 
talked of establishing a community (jema'ah) to oppose the regeneration of commu-
nism. A series of crimes soon after, all linked to Pondok Ngruki, strengthened the 
government case against Sungkar, Ba'asyir, and JJ.34 Sungkar and Ba'asyir were jailed 
in 1978 for promoting an Islamic state and in 1982 sentenced to nine years in prison, 
reduced to three years on appeal, which meant they were released for time already 
served. After two years organizing and awaiting the outcome of a prosecution appeal 
against the reduced sentences, in 1985 they fled to Malaysia, only returning to Indo-
nesia following the fall of Suharto in 1998. 
While in Malaysia, Sungkar and Ba'asyir travelled to Saudi Arabia to raise funds 
and sent volunteers to southern Thailand, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the southern 
Philippines for military training, as well as dispersing other members to Germany, 
Spain, Holland, and elsewhere. After Ba'asyir's return, in addition to running Pondok 
Ngruki, in 2000 he helped found the MMI in Yogyakarta as an umbrella group for orga-
nizations wishing to build "an Islamic state and ... an Islamic leadership in the coun-
try as well as in Muslim communities throughout the world."35 Ba'asyir was elected as 
the MMI's amir (commander) of its governing council, the Ahlul Halli Wal 'Aqdi 
(AHWA). Along with the MMI's commitment to introducing Islamic law to Indonesia, 
the AHWA also had the further goal of establishing a new international caliphate, 
which also arose in JI's claimed intentions for archipelagic Southeast Asia. In 2003 
Ba'asyir was convicted of subversion by a court in Jakarta and received a four-year jail 
sentence. A number of JI operatives were also arrested and convicted ofresponsibility 
for the 2002 Bali bombings. On August 12, 2003, JI's chief operations officer Hambali 
was arrested in Ayuthyah, Thailand, where he was allegedly planning to bomb a forth-
coming meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. 
The ICG claims that it is the intention of JI to establish a group of caliphates in 
Southeast Asia under an overarching Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state), based on 
mantiqi representing administrative territories. Mantiqi One is said to focus on pen-
insular Malaysia, southern Thailand, and Singapore, and was led by Riduan Isamud-
din (Hambali) until 2002. Mantiqi Two focuses on Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan, 
while Mantiqi Three administers operations in the southern Philippines, Sabah, Sara-
wak (Malaysia), Brunei, and Sulawesi (Indonesia). Mantiqi Four was said to focus on 
West Papua and Australia, with its primary purpose being fundraising activities. 35 The 
rcG notes that the mantiqi comprise a territorial administrative structure equivalent 
to regions, with waklah (districts) beneath them and flah (cells) at the bottom. JI 
also has a special operations unit, Laskar Khos, which was held by Indonesian na-
tional police to be responsible for the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 
2003.37 JI's senior bomb-maker, Aazahari bin Husin, was killed in a shoot-out with 
police in Java in November 2005. 
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Following the success of the crackdown on JI and disputes over its methods, in 
2005 JI split into a "bombing faction" of up to fifty members divided into cells of five to 
ten people and a more mainstream group of up to a thousand members that continued 
to conduct militant training and was suspected of carrying out armed robberies. 3s JI 
was also believed to have produced a leaner, more extreme, and less religiously fo-
cused splinter group, known as Kompak (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, 
Crisis Prevention Committee), which had been engaged in attacks against Christians 
in Ambon, Maluku and Poso, Sulawesi. Kompak, or Laskar Mujahidin Kompak,39 pri-
marily trains other groups in armed anti-Christian and terrorist activities. Its first 
reported activity was in November 2001 when it bombed a church in North Jakarta 
and was held accountable for the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls in Central 
Sulawesi in 2005. JI also retained active links in the southern Philippines, with the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf Group, and was believed to have been 
involved in escalating violence in southern Thailand.40 
Other Militant Islamist Organizations 
After JI, the next best known Indonesian militant Islamist organization was Laskar 
Jihad (LJ). LJ claimed it had ceased operations on October 13, 2002, the day after the 
first Bali bombing, although it was known to be active well after this announcement. 
LJ was not technically identified as a terrorist organization and benefited from explic-
itly Islamic army officers, who assisted its training, funding, and logisticsY Approxi-
mately 3,000 LJ members freely travelled to Maluku in 2000,42 despite President Ab-
durrahman Wahid's pledge to prevent them from leaving Java. According to Western 
intelligence sources, over US$9 million was transferred from the Indonesian army's 
Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Strategis Cadangan Angkatan Darat, Kostrad) 
to LJ, and further funds were diverted from the business branch of Kostrad. 
LJ was divided into four battalions, each with four companies, and each company 
with four platoons and each platoon with three squads. LJ also had special forces, 
intelligence, and logistics units. After its "closure," LJ continued to operate in West 
Papua and in 2003 attempted to become involved in the Aceh conflict, a move bluntly) 
rejected by GAM. In August 2003, a group that appeared to be a locally recruited ver-
sion of LJ, Laskar Tabligh,43 clashed with pro-independence protesters at Wamena 
over government plans to divide th~ province. 
Following LJ, Laskar Mujahidin (LM) is the military wing of the MMI, founded by 
Mohammad Iqbal Abdurrahman (a.k.a. Abu Jabril) and Agus Dwikarna, who were 
also on JI's skura (council). Several hundred LM members were active in Maluku in 
operations against Christian militias and civilians, and briefly in Poso, Central Su-
lawesi. At its peak in 2001, LM had around 2,000 active members, who were better 
armed and trained than LJ. According to independent observers in Ambon in early 
2002, LM and LJ maintained separate operations and were known to clash,44 as well as 
with soldiers and the police. LM leader Haris Fadillah (a.k.a. Abu Dzar) was killed 
fighting Christians in Ambon on October 23, 2000. Fadillah was the father-in-law of 
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Omar al-Faruq, a Kuwaiti who was claimed to be "al-Qaeda's principal relationship 
manager in Southeast Asia."45 AI-Faruq trained at al Qaeda's Camp Khalden in Af-
ghanistan, fought in Ambon, and was later held in detention in the United States. A 
video-tape featuring Fadillah encouraging Muslims to take up arms was distributed 
throughout Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. This and other videos, 
said to have been financed by Agus Dwikarna, were produced by Aris Munandar, who 
was claimed as the "right-hand man" to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.46 In 2000, Dwikarna co-
founded the Laskar Jundullah, and in 2001 established a training camp near Poso, the 
site of heavy Muslim-Christian fighting in Central Sulawesi, where training of recruits 
was undertaken by Faruq. 
There were at least two "Laskar Jundullahs" operating in Central Sulawesi, the 
first appearing to be linked to the MILF. This group appeared following religious con-
flic,t in Paso in June 2000. The later Laskar Jundullah was established as the military 
wing of the Preparatory Committee for Upholding Islamic Law (Komite Persiapan 
Penegakan Syariat Islam, KPPSI) , which was in effect the local branch of JI. Laskar 
Jundullah cofounder Dwikarna was arrested in the Philippines in March 2002 and 
sentenced to prison for possession of firearms and explosives. Dwikarna was close to 
the head of the Spanish branch of al Qaeda, Imad Eddin Barakat Yarbas, an associate 
of Mohammad Atta, the alleged leader of the 9/11 attacks. In June 2000, Dwikarna 
allegedly acted as a guide for al Qaeda figures visiting Indonesia, including Osama bin 
Laden's former second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and former al Qaeda military 
chief Mohammad Atef. Laskar Jundullah members were arrested and arraigned on 
charges relating to bombings in South Sulawesi in December 2002. In January 2003, 
Indonesian intelligence confirmed that Laskar Jundullah training camps in Central 
Sulawesi had received funds, logistics, and trainers from al Qaeda.47 
More of a religious militia than other military/terrorist organizations, the Front 
Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) was founded on August 17, 1998 (In-
donesian Independence Day), and used by the army to intimidate prodemocracy pro-
testers during a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in No-
vember that year. Support for FPI came from defense minister and TNI commander in 
chief General Wiranto, Jakarta Military Commander Djaja Suparman, and Jakarta 
Police Commander Nugroho Jayusman. The later focus of the FPI was to raid "anti-
Islamic" establishments, notably bars, pool halls, gambling venues, nightclubs, and 
brothels. Similar to the FPI, the Taliban Brigade was a small MMI-linked organization 
based in Bandung, West Java, and was regarded as responsible for two failed bombing 
attempts there in December 2000. 
'!\vo well-placed sources in the Indonesian government told the author that it 
was believed at the very highest levels of government that there were links between 
BIN and elements of JI. This alleged association, which recalls the Opsus-Komando 
Jihad link of the 1970s in which intelligence agents from Opsus-infiltrated and influ-
enced the actions if the Islamist terrorist organization Komando Jihad, was intended 
to strengthen the relative position of the security forces in the state and create fur-
ther pressure for the resumption of external military support for the TN!. Laskar 
Jihad, meanwhile, has appeared to be increasingly transparently an arm of the TNI in 
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its efforts to suppress local separatist movements, especially along with Laskar Ta-
bligh, in West Papua. This in turn fell neatly into the TNI's policy of "Total People's 
Defence" as Rakyat Terlatih (lit. "trained people). LJ's "dissolution" after the JI 
bombing in Bali on October 12, 2002, was in response to a need to reorganize follOwing 
the reduction of tensions in Maluku and the poor publicity it was bringing Indonesia. 
I ts resurrection in a smaller, modified form also showed the usefulness of such militia 
to the TNI, and reinforced the nexus between the state and terrorism in Indonesia so 
pronounced during the Suharto era. 
Laskar Jundullah appeared to have become inactive in 2002, but from October 
2003 onward there was a renewed spate of killings of Christians in the Poso area of 
Central Sulawesi. Following arrests, there were official reports that elements of Laskar 
Jundullah were still active and had coordinated its attacks with representatives of J1. 
These attacks were also linked to individuals who had large and expanding economic 
interests in the region. So, too, Laskar Mujahidin had reduced its public presence to 
uniformed displays of solidarity for Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Despite sharing similar goals 
and deriving from similar bases of support, relations between Laskar Jihad, Laskar 
Jundullah, and Laskar Mujahidin were poor, primarily reflecting animosities between 
leaders and, to some extent, conflict over control in particular regions. FPI, mean-
while, remained active. 
U.S. SUPPORT 
Just eleven days before the 2004 Indonesian presidential election, on September 9, a 
large car bomb exploded at the gates of the Australian embassy on the busy Jalan 
Rasuna Said in the middle of the diplomatic and business district. At least 11 people 
were killed and almost 200 injured in the blast, which was officially attributed to JI. 
In response to the embassy bombing, the government announced the formation of a 
new, predominantly anti-terror task force, comprising members of an existing anti-
terror task force (established after the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing of August 5, 
2003) and police, army, navy, and air fore special forces (Destasemen 88/Gegana, Ko-
passUS, Denjaka, and Bravo) under the auspices of BIN. The task force was given 
powers to operate both openly and covertly and otherwise subverted the legislated 
sole investigative role of the polioo. The subversion of the police role was seen as re-
flecting the failure of the police to stem terrorism, despite their successes in tracking 
down a large number of people associated with the 2002 Bali bombing. It was also 
seen to play out the growing tensions between the "security" branches and the declin-
ing political fortunes of police chief Da'i Bachtiar. Bachtiar had until this time re-
ceived significant U.S. support for Indonesia's anti-terrorism measures, including a 
favorable meeting with then Secretary of State Colin Powell, the directors of the CIA 
and FBI, and deputy secretary for Defense, Paul Wolfowitz: 
The police, he said, had also been financially supported by the US: "10 million. We get 
big bucks. We got 50 million all up. Sure. They keep asking about [Detasemen 1 88 .... 
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The Secretary-General of Interpol came to visit Aceh. I met him. He said our police 
were dealing with terrorism in a professional manner. 500 million euros. For the police. 
Long term. So far I've received directly 500 from Denmark. They gave 5, but 500 all up. 
The Dutch gave 2 .... the other day I got 2 million from Holland .... From America ... it 
was 50. Is it 50 already? You know how much the army got? 600. Then they had to get 
involved."48 
According to O'Shea: 
The money is flowing like water but outside the chamber, unrelated to the anti-terror 
funding, is a scene that should make donors think twice. A man from the Religious Mfairs 
Commission sitting next door counts cash to be distributed amongst voting politicians .... 
With the cash cow growing fatter by the day, some analysts even suggest the police now 
have too much to gain from the war on terror.49 
The centralization and extension of powers of the new anti-terror task force greatly 
strengthened the authority of the chief of BIN, Hendropriyono. Hendropriyono had 
once been close to Yudhoyono, but they had since split over their differences on mili-
tary reform and wider political preferences. Hendropriyono's implication in the mur-
der of human rights activist Munir in 2004 made it easier for Yudhoyono to remove 
him from his powerful post and on October 25, 2005, replace him with trusted col-
league, Major General Syamsir Siregar. 
The election ofYudhoyono also prompted both the United States and Australia to 
renew links to the TNI,50 on the basis that the election was a confirmation of Indone-
sia's (procedural rather than substantive) democratization. However, Yudhoyono was 
locked in a struggle with the TNI to bring it properly under civilian authority. While 
he had replaced the hard-line commander-in-chief and chief of staff of the army with 
more moderate generals and had begun to institute the hiving off of at least some mili-
tary businesses, the TNI was continuing to resist his reforms, exempting many busi-
nesses from removal from military control, not acknowledging any of its illegal activi-
ties, and, according to some observers, destabilizing parts of the country by way of 
unsettling Yudhoyono's political authority, which had been done with great effect to 
President Abdurrahman Wahid. 
Until the fall of Suharto, Indonesia had been characterized by a high level of 
public surveillance down to the most local level. As with other authoritarian or to-
talitarian states, cuak (spies) were operative in every social context. The primary 
coordination of local cuak came from Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa, Village 
Building Police), the village or neighborhood noncommissioned military officers (not 
police as such) under Koter (Komando Territorial, the Territorial Command structure). 
Babinsa were also a principal site for operating local illegal businesses, including 
gambling, extortion, prostitution, and drug running. Babinsa and the military role in 
domestic surveillance were scrapped in 2003 as a part of Indonesia's political liberal-
ization and the removal of its intelligence function. However, just days after the sec-
ond Bali bombing in October 2004, at the sixtieth anniversary celebration of the 
founding of the TNI, in a move away from military reform and possibly in response to 
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military pressure, President Yudhoyono "instructed" the TNI to "take part in effec-
tively curbing, preventing and acting against terrorism." TNI commander-in-chief 
General Endriartono Sutarto said, 
The government has given us (the TN!) a clear order to participate in the war against 
terrorism. First, we will raise the public awareness about the condition of people's neigh-
borhoods. Second, we will also activate the territorial command up to the village level, and 
third, of course, we will share intelligence information with other institutions, especially 
the police. 
This announcement immediately led to widespread public criticism of the move 
being a return to New Order-type surveillance. Even Defense Minister Juwono Du-
darsono admitted that "No one can give a guarantee that the military will not abuse 
its Territorial role. All we civilians can do is to do our best to control the military."51 
Along with the reintroduction of local military intelligence activities, the govern-
ment also enacted a new anti-terrorism law, Number 34/2004, which among other 
things extended the period suspects could be held without charge and established a 
new military (army-based) "anti-terror desk." 
CONCLUSION 
The security situation in Indonesia in the post-9lll period represented a backward 
and forward political dance. On balance, there was overall improvement in both the 
security environment and civilian control of the military, although this was slight and 
also marked by a reassertion of military intervention in intelligence matters and a 
diminution of relative police powers, which was originally instituted to help remove 
the military from politics. In terms of militant Islamism, JI was "damaged but 
still dangerous."52 However, the general record of successful operations against J1 by 
the police, in cooperation with foreign police, showed that military intervention in the 
anti-terrorist program was probably unnecessary and certainly risky in light of the 
military's repressive history. Perhaps more worrisome were the identified links be-
tween Indonesia's military and intelligence services with militant Islamism, including 
JI. These links reflected both a long-standing policy of retaining such organizations 
for covert domestic purposes as well as for the flow-on effect such organizations had 
in promoting foreign police and military aid to Indonesia's security services. 
On a more positive note, the peace agreement signed in Helsinki on August 15, 
2005, between the government of Indonesia and GAM was still holding well more than 
a year later and appeared to be a long-term fixture. A significant part of the agreement 
was not only the disarming and demobilization of GAM in exchange for significant po-
litical and economic concessions, but the reduction of the TNI presence in Aceh by more 
than half. This not only ended a significant security threat in Indonesia, it was a blow 
against the TNI's "military solution" policy and weakened the TNI both politically and 
economically. More negatively, however, the TNI doubled its permanent numbers in 
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West Papua which, along with other "nationalist" measures hung over from the Mega-
wati government, led to an upsurge is protests and killings there in March 2006. 
Indonesia is a country in political transition and as O'Donneell and Schmitter 
have noted, such transition must be handled carefully and is not guaranteed to be 
successful. Yudhoyono was taking an almost textbook approach to the transition pro-
cess and appeared to be achieving small but significant successes. In this, he was 
supported by the United States and its local allies, including Australia. However, de-
spite his own problems with civilian control over the TNI and external acknowledg-
ment that military to military engagement had failed in the past to assist reform,53 
both the United States and Australia had renewed such links, thus strengthening the 
TNI's position. That such links were undertaken as part of coopting Indonesia's com-
mitment to the war on terror failed to acknowledge that Indonesia would not partici-
pate in any international activity that involves attacks against Muslim states;54 it was 
the police that had been most successful in cracking down on Islamist terrorism 
within Indonesia, and Indonesia's other domestic problems were unrelated to this 
wider conflict. It appeared, most of all, that the United States wanted to renew its 
military association with Indonesia for a range of strategic reasons; the war on terror 
just happened to be strategically convenient. 
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